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Clusters are recognized when meningococcal cases of
the same phenotypic strain (markers: serogroup, serotype,
and subtype) occur in spatial and temporal proximity. The
incidence of such clusters was compared to the incidence
that would be expected by chance by using space-time
nearest-neighbor analysis of 4,887 confirmed invasive
meningococcal cases identified in the 9-year surveillance
period 1993–2001 in the Netherlands. Clustering beyond
chance only occurred among the closest neighboring cases
(comparable to secondary cases) and was small (3.1%,
95% confidence interval 2.1%–4.1%). 
A
n outbreak of invasive meningococcal disease is a
public health emergency because of the disease’s
unpredictability, sudden lethality, and serious sequelae.
Although risk factors are known, the reasons for develop-
ing invasive disease are not fully understood. Most per-
sons, when colonized with Neisseria meningitidis, become
asymptomatic carriers and are sources for further transmis-
sion. The apparently sporadic occurrence of invasive dis-
ease reflects invisible transmission chains of circulating
strains, since invasive disease develops in only a small
proportion of those infected. The precise mechanisms gen-
erating clusters or outbreaks puzzle public health workers,
epidemiologists, and microbiologists (1,2).
During the 9-year period 1993–2001, the Netherlands
had a population between 15.3 and 16 million and encom-
passed 33,900 km2. Most of the ≈500 annual reports of
meningococcal disease were sporadic cases, and serogroup
B is the most common. From 1993 to 2001, the number of
reported cases was from 422 to 770 per year; the peak
occurred in 2001 as a result of an increase in serogroup C
meningococcal cases. The mean incidence, based on
reports of ≈3.4 per 100,000 per year, is comparable to that
in England and Wales (3.7) (3) but three times higher than
in the United States (1.1) (4). The Dutch policy for pre-
venting secondary cases compares to the policy in most
Western countries and is based on identifying and prophy-
lactically treating close contacts. When two or more possi-
bly related cases (secondary case or cluster) are identified,
group contacts in an educational institution (daycare cen-
ter or primary school) also receive prophylaxis with
rifampicin. In the Netherlands, routine vaccination of chil-
dren for serogroup C meningococcal disease was imple-
mented in September 2002. Furthermore, from June to
October 2002, a vaccination campaign was carried out for
all 1- to 18-year-olds in response to the increase of
serogroup C cases in 2001 and 2002.
Outbreaks are recognized when place (e.g., an educa-
tional institution like a primary school), time (e.g., within
1 month), and conventional phenotypic markers (same
serogroup, serotype, and subtype) make a connection like-
ly (field cluster) or when an excess of incidence (e.g., 20x
normal) is noticed in a retrospectively specified geograph-
ic or population area within a chosen period (community
outbreak). Field clusters and community outbreaks are
rarely seen in the Netherlands, possibly because of under-
reporting. A group of unrelated cases that occur in tempo-
ral and spatial proximity may be misinterpreted as a cluster
or outbreak, but these cases would not justify additional
public health measures, except perhaps to reassure the
public. In a real cluster, cases of the same strain occur in
temporal and spatial proximity at a higher frequency than
by chance. The objective of our study was to explore the
phenomenon of meningococcal clustering in a more objec-
tive way by using a nearest-neighbor analysis in space and
time that compares the actual occurrence of clusters with
their background incidence. 
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Data Collection
We used data collected from two surveillance sources:
mandatory reports from January 1993 through May 2001
and reports of laboratory-confirmed N. meningitidis iso-
lates collected by the Netherlands Reference Laboratory
for Bacterial Meningitis in the same period. Additionally,
reports of field clusters occurring during the same time
were collected as reference. 
Reported Cases
Report data were obtained from the Inspectorate of
Health Care. According to the Communicable Disease Act,
physicians must report cases of meningococcal disease to
their Municipal Public Health Service. The case definition
for report includes clinical meningococcal disease in com-
bination with microbiologic confirmation: N. meningitidis
isolated from blood or cerebrospinal fluid (CSF);
meningococcal antigen or DNA detected in cerebrospinal
fluid by latex agglutination or polymerase chain reaction;
or gram-negative diplococci detected in cerebrospinal
fluid, blood, or skin biopsy. The following information
was available on an individual level: date of birth, gender,
initials, postal code, municipality, date of report, date of
first symptoms, date of diagnosis, and age at notification.
Laboratory Isolates
The reference laboratory collects meningococcal
strains from patients with meningitis or septicemia, isolat-
ed from blood or CSF. Strains are sent on a voluntary basis
to the reference laboratory by all clinical microbiologic
laboratories throughout the country. A strain is defined as
an isolate of N. meningitidis from a patient. When two
strains have the same phenotypic markers (serogroup,
serotype, and subtype), these are considered to be identical
and to belong to one serosubtype. The following informa-
tion was available for individual patients: date of birth,
gender, initials, municipality, date of sample collection,
submitting laboratory, date of receipt of strain, date of
blood culture, date of lumbar puncture, source of isolate
(blood or CSF), serogroup, serotype, and subtype. 
Record Linkage
Records between these two sources were linked (case
ascertainment) by using SAS version 8.1 (SAS Institute
Inc., Cary, NC). First, records were linked by date of birth,
gender, and initials. Records remaining unlinked were then
linked by combinations of two variables. The links in the
first step were considered correct, while all further links
were checked manually for consistency in data fields,
spelling mistakes in initials, date of birth, and municipality.
In Table 1, we provide an overview of the number of cases
and serogroup profile of the data used in our analysis. 
Field Cluster
After notification of meningococcal disease, the
Municipal Public Health Service considers taking public
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Table 1. Overview of meningococcal disease cases and serogroup profile of cases included for analysis, 1993–2001 
Characteristic  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
a 2000 2001
b Total 
Reported cases  
(per 100,000 population) 
563 
(3.7) 
422 
(2.7) 
460 
(3.0) 
482 
(3.1) 
491 
(3.2) 
505 
(3.2) 
531 
(3.4) 
516 
(3.3) 
770 
(4.8) 
4,740 
(3.4) 
Case-ascertainment  
(per 100,000 population) 
753 
(4.9) 
571 
(3.7) 
689 
(4.5) 
659 
(4.3) 
658 
(4.2) 
704 
(4.5) 
597 
(3.7) 
532 
(3.4) 
396 
(5.9) 
5,559 
(4.3) 
Nonconfirmed cases
c  115  91 88 94  103  86 44  1  41 663 
Meningococcal cases included 
for analysis 
638 480 601 565 555 619 553 531 354  4,896 
Serogroup profile
d            
A  3 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 
B (%)  524 
(82) 
399  
(83) 
527  
(88) 
498  
(88) 
458  
(83) 
536 
(87) 
455 
(82) 
413 
(78) 
229 
(65) 
4,039 
(82) 
C (%)  101 
(16) 
65 
(12) 
57 
(11) 
57 
(11) 
81 
(15) 
72  
13) 
79 
(15) 
103 
(19) 
114 
(21) 
729 
(15) 
W135 (%)  4 (1)  5 (1)  7 (1)  3 (1)  6 (1)  4 (1)  12 (2)  12 (2)  7 (2)  60 (1) 
X  1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 7 
Y  4 5 7 5 6 2 5 2 3 39 
Z  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
29E  0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Not  serogroupable  1 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 8 
aCase-ascertainment (number of cases after linking procedure) was hampered due to lack of identifying variables from April 1, 1999, when the new Dutch 
Communicable Disease Act was introduced.  
bLaboratory data included from January 1993 to May 2001; during the year 2001, the surveillance was more active because of the increase in serogroup 
C cases. 
cAfter linking the reported cases with the laboratory cases, no strain was available for these cases. 
dOf 4,896 confirmed cases, 9 could not be used in the analysis because of recording errors: 2 serogroup A cases, 4 serogroup B cases, 1 serogroup C, 1 
serogroup W135, and 1 serogroup Y. 
 health measures. Depending on the attentiveness of the
communicable disease consultant, field clusters are recog-
nized and reported to the Inspectorate of Health Care,
which made this information available for our investiga-
tion. Accurate data on actual rifampicin prophylaxis were
not available. Field clusters were named after their proba-
ble transmission route: family, daycare center, primary
school, or swimming pool. 
Statistical Analysis
Clustering of meningococcal cases is defined as excess
occurrence of the same serosubtype in patients, in spatial
and temporal proximity. We used patients’ residences as
“place” and chose the first day of illness as “time.” The
actual incidence of clustering was compared to the inci-
dence that would be expected by chance, by using space-
time nearest-neighbor analysis (Figure 1). To quantify the
phenomenon of clustering, we defined the concept of
space-time nearest-neighborship as follows. We defined nt
nearest-neighbors in time of case 1 as the n cases that
occur closest (in time) to case 1. Similarly the np nearest-
neighbors in place of case 1 are the n cases that occur clos-
est in space to case 1. The distance between cases is
defined as the distance in a straight line between the geo-
graphic centers of the reported cases (municipality or
postal code area). The k cases that are both nt nearest-
neighbors in time and np nearest-neighbors in place (inter-
section of place and time), are now the group of the 1st,
2nd, …, and kth nearest-neighbors (i.e., nearest in both
place and time). The order (first, second, and so on) is set
in such a way that k = 1 defines the first nearest-neighbor,
k = 2 defines the second nearest-neighbor, and so on. A
program was written in C to analyze kth nearest-neighbor-
ship. This program is available from the authors. 
First, we calculated the “background” probability that
a kth nearest-neighbor is of the same strain, under no clus-
tering as the null hypothesis, by calculating the frequency
of having a kth nearest-neighbor of the same strain when
the observed strains are randomly assigned to the
observed dates and places of actual cases. This shuffling
is called random labeling (5,6). The null hypothesis
assumes complete homogeneity in space and time, which
is plausible for small areas within a short time (e.g., 1
year); however, spatial and temporal heterogeneity may
give rise to spurious clustering. The prevalence of
serogroup B was not constant during the 9 years of our
study (Table 1), and the ratio of serogroup B to other
serogroups varies somewhat by region (Figure 2).
Therefore, this concept of “random labeling” may not
apply to our meningococcal data, since it ignores regional
differences in occurrence and slow trends in the presence
of certain serosubtypes over the period of observation.
Thus, random labeling would underestimate the true null
(under no clustering) background probability that a near-
est-neighbor is of the same strain, thereby overestimating
clustering. We decided that the true null background prob-
ability is best estimated by the observed frequency of the
mean of the 6th to 10th nearest-neighbors (the null proba-
bility of no clustering), which assumes clustering is a pri-
ori implausible beyond the 5th nearest-neighbor. We
calculated 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the excess
chance that the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth near-
est-neighbor is of the same strain by using paired t-tests.
These paired t-tests were carried out on a) the indicator
(0/1) variable, indicating whether the first, second, third,
fourth, or fifth nearest-neighbor is of the same strain, and
b) the average of five such indicator variables for the 6th
to 10th nearest-neighbor. The above analyses were calcu-
lated for all cases combined but also separately for
serogroups B, C, and W135 and for each serosubtype
separately.
Results 
During the 9-year surveillance period, 4,896 confirmed
cases were noted. Of these, nine cases could not be used
because of recording errors (Table 1). The dataset was
made up of 250 different meningococcal serosubtypes, of
which 42 were seen in 20 or more cases (4,189/4,887 =
86% of all strains), while 99 serosubtypes were only con-
nected to one case (Appendix online, available from
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol10no9/03-0992_
app.htm).
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Figure 1. The concept of space-time nearest-neighborship.
Nearest-neighbors in space-time are defined as cases that are
nearest-neighbors in both space and time. To define the kth near-
est-neighbors in space-time, we chose the number n (e.g., n = 7;
thus 7 cases [O] occurring within 15 km and 7 cases [+] occurring
within 13 days) in each of the neighborhoods so that the number
of cases occurring in the intersection of the two neighborhoods (⊕)
equals exactly k (e.g., k = 2, the first and second nearest-neighbor
in space-time). The radius is shown by the data, given a certain n.
For a fixed chosen value of k, the value of n varies among cases
and is found with a computer-intensive search algorithm. An exam-
ple is shown of the two space-time nearest-neighbors of a given
index case, by taking n = 7 at a radius of 15 km (in space), and 13
days (in time). The order is determined by increasing or decreas-
ing the space-time intersection. The observed background value of cases in temporal
and spatial proximity to an index case being of the same
serosubtype is 12.0%. When random labeling was used,
this percentage was 9.7%. We observed that 15.1% of the
first nearest-neighbors were of the same serosubtype, an
excess probability or secondary case percentage of 3.1%
(CI 2.1%–4.1%). As most nearest-neighbors are coinciden-
tal, little difference was seen in the mean temporal and spa-
tial distance between nearest-neighbors of the same
serosubtype (6.1 km [range 0–44 km] and 13.2 days [range
0–63 days]) and those of different serosubtype (7.6 km
[range 0–49 km] and 14.3 days [range 0–380 days]). The
probability of the second, third, fourth, and fifth nearest-
neighbors being of the same serosubtype did not differ sig-
nificantly from background values (this difference was
0.6%, 0.3%, 0.8%, and 0.4%, respectively). For serogroup
B, the excess probability was 3.1% (CI 2.0%–4.3%,
n = 4,035) for the first nearest-neighbor. For serogroup C,
the excess probability was 3.5% (CI 1.6%–5.3%; n = 728),
and for serogroup W135 no excess probability was found
(n = 59). Seven different serosubtypes, accounting for 14%
(694/4,887) of all cases, showed significant excess proba-
bility (Table 2): B:1:P1.4 (12%), B:1:P1.16 (10%),
B:4:P1.5 (20%), B:4:P1.10 (5%), B:nt:P1.nt (11%),
B:15:P1.7 (11%), and B:15:P1.7,16 (7%). 
The Municipal Public Health Services identified 40
field clusters involving 21 different serosubtypes: 11 pri-
mary school clusters (range 2–5 cases), 7 daycare center
clusters (2–3 cases), 1 swimming pool cluster (4 cases),
and 21 household clusters (2–3 cases). The cases all
occurred within 21 days from the first case, and 78%
(32/41) occurred within 8 days. 
Six serosubtypes were identified by both methods as
serosubtypes with clustering, 15 were identified only in
field clusters, and 1 in statistical clustering only. Most field
clusters consisted of only two cases (75%); this result is
consistent with the results of our statistical approach.
Discussion 
Our results suggest that in the context of current public
health efforts, clustering of meningococcal disease is rare
in the Netherlands and other Western countries. Our near-
est-neighbor analysis provided a useful method of assess-
ing the phenomenon of meningococcal clustering by
taking random variance into account. Cases of the same
serosubtype appeared beyond the expected background
rate and were only seen in the first nearest-neighbor, which
implies that only secondary cases occur in excess of
chance (3.1%). Connections of more than two cases could
not be demonstrated beyond chance. Throughout the year,
invasive disease appears mostly as isolated cases. This
limited clustering may reflect the positive effect of the pro-
phylactic rifampicin policy; however, household field
clusters are still reported, which possibly shows the con-
straints of this prevention policy. This paucity of real sec-
ondary cases is consistent with findings from other studies.
A Belgian study found 4.4% secondary cases (range
2.0%–5.2%) in 1,913 cases of invasive meningococcal dis-
ease from 1971 through 1976 (7). In France, 37 (4.5%) co-
primary and secondary cases were found in 814 reported
cases from 1997 to 1988 (8). ADutch study reported 1.4%
co-primary and secondary cases among 507 cases from
1989 to 1990 (9). In England and Wales, 17 (0.5%) sec-
ondary cases were found among 3,256 cases from 1984
through 1987 (10). In a Danish study published in 2000,
1.2% secondary cases were observed in 172 cases of
meningococcal disease (11).
Apart from proper prophylactic treatment, no addition-
al measures could prevent further cases, since excess clus-
tering only occurs in the first nearest-neighbors, while a
cluster is only identified after at least two connected cases.
The field cluster analysis confirms this assessment, since
most new cases occur within a short period (78% within 8
days), occur geographically close to each other (patients
are in the same household, daycare center, or primary
school), and occur mostly in pairs (75%). These findings
are consistent with observations in field cluster studies
showing that secondary invasive disease most likely
occurs nearby, within the next few days. In a Belgian
study, 83% of 63 secondary cases occurred within 8 days
of identifying the index case (7); in a French study, 31
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Figure 2. Distribution of the ratio of serogroup B to other
serogroups (Ratio B/O) per province in the Netherlands
(1993–2001). 
Ratio B/O(82%) of 38 secondary cases occurred within 8 days (8).
Almost all (94%, 29/31) of the secondary cases occurred
within 8 days in a study in the United States from 1980 to
1993 with eight school and university clusters (12). Five
secondary cases occurred within 8 days in a school out-
break of six cases with serogroup B meningococcal disease
in the United States (13).
Space-time clustering methods, e.g., those using the
spatial scan-statistic (14–17), have been used for surveil-
lance purposes with the objective of identifying outbreaks.
However, to our knowledge, such methods have not been
used to explore the existence of, and quantify, the phenom-
enon of clustering in a specific infectious disease. For this
purpose the Ederer-Myers-Mantel procedure has been used
(18,19); however, since this method requires separating
space and time (e.g., into provinces and years), we consid-
ered it inappropriate for our purposes. Instead, we adapted
the concept of nearest-neighborship to the two dimensions
of space and time simultaneously (5,6).
Our study has several constraints. As many serosubtypes
were rare, their individual clustering behavior could not be
fully ascertained. We used place of residence as our geo-
graphic parameter, which could underestimate clustering,
since transmission might occur at locations outside place of
residence (such as work, school, and sport clubs). Most
cases are found in children, who often spend time in day-
care centers, schools, and other places outside the home.
Since these places tend to be located in the same area as
their homes, this factor likely did not affect our results. The
extent of clustering was possibly overestimated because of
imprecise geographic coordinates since our statistical
method used the center of the municipality or postal code
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Table 2. Clustering of meningococcal disease cases by serosubtype (serogroup, serotype, and subtype)
a,b
Serosubtypes (phenotype)  Field clusters
c Cases/cluster %  excess probability  95% CI  n 
B:1:P1.4   1 Primary school  3  12.0  4.2%–19.7% 87 
B:1:P1.14  1 Swimming pool  4  7.2  NS (–8.0% to 22.4%) 25 
1 Primary school  3 
1 Daycare center  2 
B:1:P1.16 
1 Household  2 
10.0  2.4%–17.6% 92 
B:4:P1.2,5  1 Household  2  1.9  NS (–3.8% to 7.7%)  52 
2 Primary schools  3 and 5 
4 Primary schools  2 
2 Daycare centers  2 and 3 
B:4:P1.4 
6 Households  2 
2.0  NS (–0.7% to 4.6%)  1,376 
B:4:P1.5  1 Daycare center  2  20.0  3.2%–36.9% 25 
B:4:P1.7  NFC    6.4  NS (–2.7% to 15.5%) 47 
B:4:P1.9  1 Primary school  3  7.2  NS (–8.0% to 22.4%) 36 
B:4:P1.10 1  Household  2  4.8  0.1%–9.5% 205 
B:4:P1.14  NFC    5.9  NS (–2.5% to 14.2%) 34 
B:4:P1.15  NFC    4.0  NS (–0.4% to 8.4%)  129 
B:4:P1.16  1 Household  2  2.2  NS (–2.4% to 6.8%)  63 
1 Primary school  2 
1 Daycare center  2 
B:4:P1.NT 
1 Household  3 
2.6  NS (–0.8% to 6.1%)  455 
B:NT:P1.14  2 Households  2 and 3  13.0  NS (–1.9% to 27.9%) 23 
B:NT:P1.15  1 Household  2  7.2  NS (–1.7% to 16.0%) 39 
B:NT:P1.16  1 Household  2  10.0  NS (–4.4% to 24.4%) 20 
B:NT:P1.NT 1  Household  2  10.7  4.7%–16.8% 123 
1 Daycare center  2  B:14:P1.4 
1 Household  2 
0.9  NS (1.4% to 12.2%)  85 
B:15:P1.7 NFC    11.3  0.1%–22.6%  53 
B:15:P1.7,16 1  Primary  school  2  6.8  1.4%–12.2% 109 
B:15:P1.9  1 Household  2  10  NS (–1.4% to 21.4%) 30 
B:16:P1.14 1  Household  2  — 
d  10 
B:16:P1.2,5  1 Daycare center  3  13.6  NS (–1.9% to 29.2%) 22 
C:2a:P1.2,5  1 Household  2  –1.0  NS (–5.4% to 3.4%)  164 
C:NT:P1.5  NFC    10  NS (–4.4% to 24.4%) 20 
C:14:P1.12 1  Household  2  — 
d  2 
aThe following results are shown: serosubtypes with reported field clusters, serosubtypes with significant excess probability for clustering by nearest-
neighbor analysis, and serosubtypes with nonsignificant excess probability of more than 3% (bold percentages significant). 
bCI, confidence interval; NT, not typable; NS, not significant. 
cNFC, no field cluster was reported for this serotype. 
dCalculating excess probability not possible because n is too small. 
 area, but no more precise alternative is available. Since
only phenotypic strain typing was conducted (serogroup,
serotype, and subtype) and not the more sensitive porA-
genotyping method that would have identified spurious
clusters, background rates of clustering may have been
overestimated. However, this method is unlikely to have
affected the excess probability (3.1%) of clustering, since
this rate is probably a result of direct transmission. Our
method for calculating background value was chosen to be
as realistic as possible; however, our results do not appear
to be sensitive to the choice of 6th to 10th nearest-neigh-
bors as a reference. For instance, results from 3rd to 10th
nearest-neighbor or 7th to 10th nearest-neighbor, as a refer-
ence, were virtually identical. 
We believe that our low observed incidence of second-
ary cases partly reflects the general inability to link cases
connected by chains of transmission. As disease develops
in only a few of the links in a chain of transmission, con-
nected cases are unlikely to be still temporally and spatial-
ly close, which obviates detection. Not surprisingly, we
found three times as many serosubtypes among reported
field clusters (21 serosubtypes) than assessed with nearest-
neighborship analysis (7 serosubtypes), which confirms
that field clusters may be spurious. Although field clusters
have low specificity, their sensitivity is presumably high.
Genotyping can identify those clusters brought about by
direct transmission; nevertheless, the value of cluster sur-
veillance as a means of prevention is uncertain. Apparent
clusters are not valuable to guide additional intervention
efforts, since these would prevent few additional cases.
Our method of space-time nearest-neighborship analysis
provides a sensitive novel approach to the epidemiology of
meningococcal disease and possibly even other infectious
diseases.
Dr. Hoebe is a consultant on communicable disease control
and a member of the National Working Party for Infectious
Diseases, the Netherlands. His research interests focus on out-
break investigation.
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